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Abstract Optogenetics is an invasive neuromodulation
technology involving the use of light to control the
activity of individual neurons. Even though
optogenetics is a relatively new neuromodulation tool
whose various implications have not yet been scruti-
nized, it has already been approved for its first clinical
trials in humans. As optogenetics is being intensively
investigated in animal models with the aim of develop-
ing novel brain stimulation treatments for various neu-
rological and psychiatric disorders, it appears crucial to
consider both the opportunities and dangers such ther-
apies may offer. In this review, we focus on the
memory-modifying potential of optogenetics, investi-
gating what it is capable of and how it differs from
other memory modification technologies (MMTs). We
then outline the safety challenges that need to be ad-
dressed before optogenetics can be used in humans.
Finally, we re-examine crucial neuroethical concerns
expressed in regard to other MMTs in the light of
optogenetics and address those that appear to be unique
to the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic
technology.
Keywords Optogenetics . Memorymodification
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What Is Optogenetics?
Combining genetic engineering with optics, optogenetics
enables the user not only to record but also to manipulate
the activity of individual neurons in living tissue with the
use of light and to observe the effects of such manipula-
tion in real time [1, 2]. To this end, neurons of interest are
genetically modified to be made responsive to light,
which is done by means of inserting opsin genes (genes
that express light-sensitive proteins). This is typically
achieved with the aid of engineered viruses that are
infused into a targeted region of the brain.1 To enable
the selective expression of light-activated proteins in a
particular neural type, a cell-type specific promoter is
added to the genetic construct within the vector. Once
opsin genes arrive at their determined destination, they
cause neurons to express light-sensitive proteins. When
illuminated with light, the channels of these proteins
regulate the flow of electrically charged ions across
membranes, exacerbating or inhibiting the neuron’s firing
of action potentials, thus facilitating or preventing its
communication with other neurons (depending on which
light-activated protein is used). Thanks to this procedure,
specific neurons can be activated or deactivated “at will,”
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-020-00377-1
1 To learn about methods of neuronal targeting, see Packer et al. [3].
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making optogenetics a highly selective and precise tech-
nique for manipulating neural activity.
The Need for Further Neuroethical Debate
Although optogene t ics is a re la t ive ly new
neuromodulation technology, whose various implica-
tions are, to a large extent, difficult to foresee at the
current stage of research, its therapeutic potential has
already prompted approval for the first human trials in
the hope of developing novel treatments for intractable
diseases, such as blindness. Initial approval was provid-
ed in 2015 by the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to RetroSense Therapeutics (Ann Arbor, MI,
USA2) and in 2018 by the EU Clinical Trials Directive
to GenSight Biologics (Paris, France3). Both approvals
concerned authorization for a phase I/II clinical trial for
restoration of vision in people suffering from retinitis
pigmentosa [4]. Another disease awaiting the approval
of initial clinical trials involving the application of
optogenetic therapy and for which existing methods of
treatment show limited effectiveness is urinary bladder
syndrome [5]. Furthermore, many optogenetic studies
conducted on animal models, such as rodents or non-
human primates [6], were designed with the explicit
goal of developing better targeted brain stimulation
treatments for various psychiatric and neurological dis-
orders in humans [7–14]. These attempts, along with
rapid advancements in the field, demonstrate that
optogenetics is already progressing towards clinical ap-
plication. Moreover, some (e.g., [9, 11, 15]) argue that it
could also become an alternative form of therapy to deep
brain stimulation (DBS), another form of invasive
neuromodulation technology,4 which, over the past de-
cade, has become a widely accepted treatment method
for patients struggling with different types of disorders.
However, it is worth mentioning that both methods
seem to be developing in parallel: while some scientists
are putting their efforts into refining DBS to gain great-
er, optogenetic-like precision in targeting specific brain
structures [19], others are trying to “refine” optogenetics
to make it less invasive and to enhance its potential as a
future treatment [20].
Although approval for the first clinical trials involv-
ing optogenetic interventions on human subjects has
already stimulated preliminary discussions of most of
the basic dilemmas, such as efficacy and safety concerns
(which are actually common to all invasive
neuromodulation technologies) [21–25], a more focused
debate on the ramifications of specific optogenetic brain
interventions in humans is still lacking. As such inter-
ventions are becoming more and more plausible, given
the pace of advancement in this field and the fact that the
majority of optogenetic studies are designed exactly for
this purpose, we argue that it is crucial to begin to
address the ethical challenges that optogenetics may
entail. In the context of neuroethics, studies on memory
modification with the use of optogenetics constitute a
particularly relevant research area. This review aims to
demonstrate how recent breakthroughs in memory-
modifying research conducted on animal models can
inform us about the potential threats and opportunities
optogenetics offers. In particular, we will examine what
optogenetics is capable of, how it differs from other
existing memory-modifying technologies (e.g., DBS,
various memory-modifying drugs), and what safety
concerns need to be addressed before optogenetics can
be used on humans. Finally, we will re-examine crucial
neuroethical concerns expressed regarding other MMTs
in the light of optogenetics as well as neuroethical
challenges unique to the memory-modifying potential
of optogenetics.
Optogenetics: New Possibilities
Optogenetics enables far more precise and selective
neural control than any other existing neuromodulation
technique. For instance, DBS involves time-specific
electrical stimulation of the brain via implanted elec-
trodes. However, electrical currents spread non-selec-
tively, such that fibers in the vicinity of electrodes are
activated along with the targeted cells, making it diffi-
cult to estimate the actual volume of stimulated tissue
[26]. In contrast, pharmacological agents act more se-
lectively, as they bind to specific receptors. However, as
they alter neuronal responding for hours following ad-
ministration of the drug, they lack temporal precision
[27].
2 https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02556736
3 https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03326336
4 Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an invasive method involving
implantation of electrodes and electrical stimulation of specific regions
of the brain [16, 17]. The American Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved DBS as a treatment in Parkinson’s disease, dystonia,
essential tremor, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Today, the num-
ber of patients being treated with DBS is estimated at over 150,000
[18].
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Contrastingly, optogenetics can selectively and bidi-
rectionally modulate (i.e., enhance or inhibit) specific
cellular activity on timescales relevant to the temporal
dynamic of neural networks [2]. Moreover, since
optogenetics uses light pulses instead of electrical cur-
rents, it is compatible with neural and electrochemical
recording [28], thus enabling the adoption of real-time
stimulation parameters based on recorded activity of the
brain. These features of optogenetics makes it unsur-
passed, in terms of both spatial and temporal accuracy,
with respect to already existing MMTs. We will now
present some of the optogenetic findings derived from
studies on animal models that foreshadow what lies
ahead.
Memory Modification with the Use of Optogenetics
Implantation of “False Memories”/Modification
of Memory Details
As already mentioned, memory-modifying research is
one area which can provide a glimpse of the capabilities
of optogenetics. The first optogenetic study to gain
widespread publicity5 was a study by Ramirez et al.
[29] in which authors attempted to implant a false mem-
ory in a mouse by means of contextual fear condition-
ing. To this end, they tagged neurons of memory-
engram regions of the hippocampus6 that were active
when the mouse was placed in one context (context A),
and then activated them with light when the mouse was
placed in a different context (context B), in which it was
given mild electric shocks. This procedure produced an
association between the memory of the previously neu-
tral context A and the aversive stimulation received in
context B, which, when the mouse was reintroduced
into context A, generated a fear response (despite the
absence of any further light stimulation). To confirm
that researchers did not create a generalized fearful
memory response to any context, the mouse was placed
in a completely new context, C, where it displayed no
fear response, instead freely exploring the new environ-
ment. These results were replicated by another research
group [30]. Although false memories had previously
been planted using relatively simple misinformation
techniques, i.e., providing misleading information about
a past event either to distort the recollection of certain
details of an existing memory or to implant a new,
completely fabricated memory, this was the first study
to implant a “false memory” by manipulating the brain
activity of a non-speaking subject, bypassing the need of
any form of communication, on which simpler psycho-
logical methods rely heavily (see [31]). This optogenetic
procedure also has the unique advantage of not relying
on human-derived factors that might moderate the rate
of success in implanting false memories. For instance, in
a classic study that used the “Lost in the Mall” tech-
nique,7 implantation of false memories of being lost in a
shopping mall in childhood [31] was successful in only
~ 25% of participants (or even less, see [32]); further
studies showed that this success rate might be greatly
dependent on the convincingness of the story, the char-
acteristics of those subjected to this procedure (e.g., age
and level of suggestibility), and the characteristics of
those conveying the story (such as age advantage and
family relationship between the implanter of the false
memory and the individual who had the memory im-
planted) (e.g., [33]).
Recovery of “Lost” Memories
Another impressive demonstration of the potential of
optogenetics was provided by research on the recovery
of “lost”memories. Autobiographical memories formed
in early infancy in both humans and animals (including
mice) are rapidly forgotten, a phenomenon known as
childhood or infantile amnesia [34]. Until recently, it
was unknown whether such memories were permanent-
ly erased, e.g., due to storage failure, or became increas-
ingly inaccessible with time, e.g., due to retrieval failure.
Initial resolution of this question was provided by
Guskjolen et al. [35]. In this study, infant mice were
subjected to contextual fear conditioning, creating a
memory of having received an electric shock in a par-
ticular context (a specific chamber). Although such
memories normally decay with time due to infantile
amnesia, Guskjolen et al. [35] managed to retrieve these
“lost” infant memories by first targeting the
5 Two leading authors of this research were invited to give a TED talk:
https://www.ted.com/talks/steve_ramirez_and_xu_liu_a_mouse_a_
laser_beam_a_manipulated_memory?language=en
6 Regions known to encode a specific memory trace, or memory
engrams, which are reactivated upon retrieval.
7 The “Lost in the Mall” technique is a memory implantation method
developed by Elizabeth Loftus and Jim Coan in order to show the ease
with which one can manipulate human memory through suggestions
about events that never actually took place.
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hippocampal neurons responsible for their original
encoding during infancy and then reactivating them
3 months later when the mouse reached adulthood. This
finding demonstrated for the first time that infant mem-
ories are probably not permanently erased, but rather
become inaccessible with time due to retrieval failure. In
a similar vein, another research group showed that
memories retained under retrograde amnesia which re-
sist retention based on the use of natural recall cues are
not completely lost and can be recovered using
optogenetic stimulation, once again providing evidence
of a failure of retrieval rather than of storage [36, 37].
Both instances are pioneering, as the retrieval of “lost”
or inaccessible memories has never been achieved by
any other memory-manipulation technique and opens
up completely new and exciting avenues for future
research. For instance, its application to human subjects
may at last verify some psychoanalytic claims which
attribute a special role to bringing repressedmemories to
consciousness in order to integrate them with the sub-
ject’s representation of the self, with the aim of self-
treatment.
Erasure and Recovery of Selected Memories
on Demand
Some evidence indicates that optogenetics can also
erase and recover selected memories on demand—the
capability so desperately sought after by the protago-
nists of the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless
Mind (2004), who change their minds about consigning
their love affair to oblivion. This extraordinary possibil-
ity was demonstrated by Nabavi et al. [38], who were
able to repeatedly deactivate and reactivate a specific
memory by modifying its synaptic strength. In this
study, animals learned to associate optogenetic stimula-
tion (applied to the lateral amygdala) with an aversive
shock. Once this memory had been formed—as evi-
denced by a conditioned freezing response to
optogenetic stimulation—researchers exposed the rats
to an optical long-term depression (LTD) protocol
which disturbed this associative memory—as evidenced
by the absence of the freezing response to optogenetic
stimulation applied on the following day. To test wheth-
er this suppressed memory could be restored, the ani-
mals were then exposed to a long-term potentiation
(LTP) protocol, which succeeded in recovering the pre-
viously deactivated memory—as evidenced by re-
establishment of the freezing response to optogenetic
stimulation.
Remarkably, another line of research demonstrated
that it may be possible to reversibly deactivate and
reactivate not only relatively new [38] but even very
remote, well-consolidated memories with the use of
optogenetics [39]. This was achieved by first training a
group of mice to associate an auditory cue with an
electric shock (which resulted in the acquisition of an
auditory-cued fear memory), and then exposing them to
the cue 4 weeks later while inhibiting CA1 hippocampal
neurons, which abolished recall of the remote fear mem-
ory. Importantly, this interference was shown to be
temporary (i.e., reversible): when mice were re-tested
on the next day without optogenetic intervention, the
fear memory was still present and mice expressed the
freezing response to the shock-predicting auditory cue.
Heretofore, no other method has yet been able to switch
selected memories on and off “at will.” Although the
erasure of memories has been previously achieved using
amnestic agents, which, administered after learning, can
prevent the consolidation of newly-acquired memories,
these compounds were shown not only to act non-selec-
tively—i.e., impairing memory of all recently encoded
events and producing a form of general retrograde
amnesia—but also to be toxic for humans, which pre-
cludes their (clinical) use [40].
Modification of Memory Valence
However, for both therapeutic and ethical reasons, eras-
ing memories may not always be desirable.8 Thus, some
researchers attempted to apply optogenetics to evoke
memory valence changes (for instance, by turning a
“bad” memory into a “happy” one) without affecting
the content of memory (declarative memory of an
event). This was achieved for the first time by re-
searchers from the Tonegawa group [41], who demon-
strated that upon reactivation of a memory engram
(encoded by dentate gyrus cells of the hippocampus),
the valence of an elicited conditioned response could be
reversed by means of its reassociation with a new un-
conditioned stimulus of an opposite valence. Although
influencing memory valence had been achieved earlier
8 This very important subject matter emerging from the new possibil-
ities created by the potential of optogenetics for memory modification
should be carefully examined within the neuroethical community. We
take the first step in this process in the final section.
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by means of memory-modifying drugs [42], these sub-
stances usually act through attenuating memory consol-
idation, which changes, to some extent, the degree to
which the memories being consolidated are
remembered.
Modification of Memory (Re)consolidation
Optogenetics was also demonstrated to modulate mem-
ory consolidation, i.e., the process of stabilization of a
memory trace following its initial acquisition [43]. For
instance, researchers showed that it was possible to
facilitate or impair retention of selected new memories
by stimulating or inhibiting selected groups of neurons
of the amygdala [44]. As mentioned above, modifica-
tion of consolidation processes can be carried out using
memory-modifying drugs such as propranolol or mifep-
ristone, which manipulate the release of stress hor-
mones. Specifically, research shows that emotional
events cause an increase in the production of stress
hormones, such as adrenaline, norepinephrine, and glu-
cocorticoids, which strengthens memories of such
events by enhancing consolidation [45]. For this reason,
drugs that mimic or block the release of stress hormones
can non-selectively modulate memory for events that
are currently being consolidated. These agents were
proved to work especially well, reinforcing or impeding
the consolidation of an emotional memory, when ad-
ministered in the immediate aftermath of the emotional
event [42, 46].
However, as victims typically seek help several
weeks after the traumatic event, when memories are
well-consolidated, researchers tried to determine wheth-
er propranolol could also affect memory reconsolidation,
a process during which previously consolidated memo-
ries are made labile again via reactivation of the memory
trace [47], in order to lessen the symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).9 In a series of three
experiments, Wood et al. [48] demonstrated that admin-
istration of propranolol (a β-adrenergic blocker) or mi-
fepristone (a glucocorticoid antagonist) proved ineffec-
tive compared with a placebo treatment in blunting
PTSD symptoms or affecting physiological response
following reactivation of a traumatic memory. These
findings were further supported by [49], who also failed
to observe propranolol-induced suppression of a re-
trieved memory in humans. However, it is worth noting
that propranolol was shown to be effective in reducing
PTSD symptoms [50] or fear-related responses [51]
when administered prior to memory reactivation. The
initial 1-year follow-up study showed that propranolol
could also be effective in treating anxiety disorders and
phobias, as patients who received treatment for arachno-
phobia showed no relapse [52]. However, propranolol-
based interventions may cause development of maladap-
tive dispositions in patients; e.g., some patients wanted to
pick up a tarantula or let it crawl up their arm, thus doing
things that many nonphobic individuals would refuse to
do [53]. Furthermore, some researchers argue that the
effectiveness of propranolol might be ascribed to dis-
turbed memory retrieval or new facilitated learning [54].
Amnestic agents have also been used to interfere with
memory reconsolidation. For instance, it was shown that
infusion of a protein synthesis inhibitor [40] or applica-
tion of electroconvulsive shocks [55] following memory
retrieval might be successful in disrupting subsequent
memory retention. However, as mentioned earlier, such
treatments were shown not only to be too dangerous to
be used in humans, but also to produce general retro-
grade amnesia (i.e., disruption of all encoded memories)
rather than specific memory changes (ibidem).
In contrast to amnestic treatment, alteration of the
content of specific memories upon their retrieval has
been successfully and safely induced usingmuch simpler
behavioral methods, such as extinction training or mem-
ory updating [56]; for an extensive overview of different
behavioral methods of inducing reconsolidation in
humans, see [57]. Extinction training—a laboratory
model for exposure therapy—is also used to treat pa-
tients suffering from anxiety disorder. This therapy is
based on repeated exposure to cues or situations evoking
fear in patients in order to reduce this emotion as well as
to replace a fear-related memory with a new extinction
memory. A major limitation of this approach is that its
effects are not permanent; when a fear-related memory
begins to dominate over the extinction memory, the fear
may quickly return [58, 59]. Contrastingly, behavioral
memory updating, which is a type of extinction para-
digm, has the distinct advantage of updating a fear-
related memory with non-fearful information introduced
upon memory retrieval within the reconsolidation win-
dow. Thanks to this procedure, new information is in-
corporated into an old memory, which is thus updated.
Although as of now this approach seems to be the most
9 PTSD is a debilitating condition characterized by intrusive and
persistent recollections of highly emotional memories (Daskalakis &
Yehuda, 2014).
211Nanoethics (2020) 14:207–225
promising type of therapy for affective disorders, it is
susceptible to spontaneous recovery/relapse, as shown
by several independent attempts to translate laboratory
findings into clinical practice [54]. The potential advan-
tage of using optogenetics or optogenetic-like technolo-
gy for this purpose would be its ability to instantaneously
suppress the neural activity responsible for reactivating
an unwanted memory at the moment it occurs.
Memory Enhancement
Optogenetic modifications were also demonstrated to
enhance well-consolidated memories of positive experi-
ences, through reactivation of the dentate gyrus engram
cells responsible for encoding them originally [60]; im-
portantly, reactivating positive experiences reduced
stress-induced behaviors, counteracting deficits in moti-
vation, abnormal responses to behavioral challenges, and
anhedonia (reduced ability to seek and experience plea-
sure) when investigated in an animal model of depres-
sion (ibidem). Memory enhancement is being sought
today through a vast array of different methods aimed
at offering such benefits, ranging from physical exercises
and yoga to psychostimulants (e.g., methylphenidate)
and invasive neuromodulation techniques (for an exten-
sive review, see [61]). None of them, however, is capable
of influencing memory processes in a manner as precise
and selective as that of optogenetics. Moreover, even
methods that bear the closest resemblance to
optogenetics—such as DBS, which inhibits or exacer-
bates neural activity of selected brain regions via an
implanted electrode—appear to possess certain inherent
limitations. For instance, stimulation of the hippocampal
neurons, although successful in inducing specific mem-
ory changes via optogenetics, caused the disruption of
memory processes when less precise and selective elec-
trical currents were applied via DBS [62].
Treating Memory Impairment
Last but not least, optogenetic intervention has been
recently tested as a potential treatment for various
models of neurological disorders tested in animals.
The latest evidence indicates that optogenetics, similar
to DBS [63], shows potential for improving memory
impairments observed in neurological conditions such
as diencephalic amnesia and Alzheimer’s disease
through stimulating small thalamic nuclei [7].
Optogenetics has also contributed significantly to an
improved understanding of the dysfunctional neural
circuits underlying PTSD [64] and Parkinson’s disease
[65], inspiring novel circuit-inspired applications of
DBS (ibidem). Here, again, the precision of
optogenetics may prove to be crucial in obtaining the
most desirable outcomes from applied treatment.
Potential Applications of Optogenetics in Humans
To study optogenetic memory modifications, most of
the above-mentioned studies used very simple contex-
tual fear conditioning procedures. Thus, the question
arises whether such findings can be translated to
humans. Obviously, the answer to this question is far
from simple. However, the aforementioned procedure of
contextual-fear conditioning relies on an associative
memory system common to all mammals, including
humans [66]. Moreover, similar procedures have been
used to study the impact of other memory-modifying
techniques (such as pharmacological agents) on humans
(for a review see, e.g., [53]). Thus, at least some degree
of translatability (as well as comparability with other
MMTs) can be cautiously assumed.
The manipulation of memory in a highly controlled
manner, enabling erasure, recovery, enhancement, or
implantation of specific memories, holds promise for
victims of traumatic events, such as military conflict,
terrorism, assault, car accidents, and natural disasters,
who might otherwise suffer from intense, painful mem-
ories, andwho, inmany cases, eventually develop PTSD.
Although propranolol offers tempering of the emotional-
ity associated with memories, optogenetics may offer a
much wider range of possibilities, from the reversible
erasure of a disturbing memory [38] or the modification
of certain details [29] to the alteration of the memory
valence [41], which might facilitate a change in attitude
towards the subject’s life choices and future.
Moreover, optogenetical ly based memory
intervention—when combined with other therapeutic
measures—may also benefit depression patients by
reactivating their positive memories and/or tempering
negative ones [60]. This speculation is supported by an
observation that repeated reactivation of positive mem-
ories has been shown not only to ameliorate stress-
induced behaviors but also to boost neurogenesis (the
production of new nerve cells) [60], counteracting
depression-related impairments, such as shrinkage of
the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus [67, 68]. Finally,
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it may free patients from prolonged intake of medica-
tions and from their undesirable side effects. By
influencing consolidation processes, optogenetics may
also help to counteract the decay of our most happy
memories, enabling us to relive them in full detail,
potentially to the end of our lives [44].
By affording access to forgotten memories of infan-
cy, optogenetics could also shed light on a part of our
life that had seemed inevitably lost [35]. Some related
evidence suggests that optogenetically induced memory
modulations could be used even for such trivial pur-
poses as shaping people’s preferences and behavior, for
instance, by promoting more healthy food choices [69].
More importantly, however, optogenetics promises to
restore memory to millions of people who have been
deprived of it due to brain injuries or neurodegenerative
disorders [7, 64, 65].
These prospects have made optogenetics one of the
most rapidly developing neuromodulation technologies,
with an exponential growth in the number of papers
containing the word optogenetics in their titles [70].
However, before optogenetics can be used in humans,
it will have to face several challenges, which we will
now address.
Safety Issues and Technical Challenges
As with any invasive neuromodulation technology, the
most urgent issue requiring consideration is safety. Al-
most all available treatments for neurological or psychi-
atric disorders entail some risks and side effects. For an
intervention to be authorized for general use, the bene-
fits must outweigh the potential risks. However,
predicting the adverse consequences of various technol-
ogies is not always easy. A tragic example of a poorly
predicted outcome of medical intervention is the case of
Jesse Gelsinger, an 18-year-old who died due to
multiorgan system failure in the aftermath of clinical
trial testing for gene therapy, which, similar to
optogenetics, involved the injection of corrective genes
inserted into a weakened flu virus that was supposed to
evoke only transient, flu-like symptoms [71]. However,
since this incident, gene-therapy-based interventions
have been significantly improved and apparently no
similar accidents have occurred. Despite some inherent
risks associated with the infusion of viruses into the
human brain, recent studies have demonstrated that the
types of vectors used for optogenetic stimulation (i.e.,
lentiviruses (LVs) or adeno-associated viruses (AAVs))
are generally safe and well tolerated by patients [72, 73].
Another challenge that optogenetics will have to face
concerns the duration and consequences of the expres-
sion of light-sensitive proteins in the human brain. For
any gene therapy–based intervention to be successful,
the expression of key proteins must persist in neural
tissue either for the patient’s expected lifespan, or at
least long enough to deliver the expected treatment
outcome. Although we know that induced expression
of non-native proteins remains high in a primate brain
for as long as 15 years following the injection of an
AAV [74], still more research is needed to determine its
exact duration. In addition, there is a need to test the
consequences of long-term expression of exogenous
proteins in the mammalian brain, which have been
studied very little to date.
Another issue that may pose a challenge is the need
for rescaling. Present optogenetic studies use mouse
brains as a proxy for studying the functioning of the
human brain. However, a mouse brain is several times
smaller than a human brain, and optogenetic tools will
arguably need some adjustments. In particular, vector
delivery systems, aimed at producing protein expression
in areas large enough to induce observable effects in the
human brain, will presumably need to be developed.
Furthermore, to stimulate a targeted brain region effi-
ciently, an implantable optogenetic device requires a
sufficient light spread and intensity range and must be
able to generate diverse illumination patterns (e.g., con-
tinuous illumination or short light pulses of changeable
frequencies) and wavelengths suitable for activation of
the targeted photosensory proteins of interest.10 Until
recently, neuronal illumination and recording of a neu-
ron’s evoked electrical signal required the insertion of
two relatively large devices into the brain: fiber optic
probes and so-called “optrodes” (fiber optics combined
with electrodes). This procedure was highly invasive
and characterized by increased tissue damage and de-
clining optical output over time. In order to overcome
these limitations, several labs have worked on the de-
velopment of alternative methods of optogenetic stimu-
lation. Not surprisingly, given the rapid advancement of
optogenetic-related technology, they have already pro-
posed several ultra-miniaturized (~ 20 mg, < 10 mm3),
fully implantable, battery-free, wireless illumination
10 For the latest proposal for a solution to this problem, see Chen et al.
[20].
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devices suitable for brain and spinal cord stimulation
([75] for review; [76, 77]).
Optogenetics will evidently have to face another
type of challenge of a biological nature. It is highly
unlikely that an optogenetically identified set of hip-
pocampal neurons believed to encode a specific
memory that researchers may attempt to modify,
serves only this single function. Therefore, interven-
tions targeting specific memories may result in un-
foreseeable side effects. For instance, in one study,
strengthening taste-aversion memory in rats resulted
in changes in other taste-related behaviors [78]; in
another study, boosting of memory abilities was ac-
complished at the expense of greater sensitivity to
pain [79]. Although both of these examples come
from studies that employed the molecular form of
memory modification, it can be assumed that they
may also apply to optogenetics. Some insights into
potential and unexpected side effects can be also
gained from reports from DBS patients who experi-
enced changes in their behavior, personalities, and
identities due to neuromodulation treatment [80–84].
Moreover, the episodic memory system was demon-
strated to be widely distributed throughout the brain,
comprising not only the hippocampus but also other
surrounding structures of the medial temporal lobe, such
as the perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal cor-
tices, as well as sites to which the hippocampus is
structurally connected, such as mamillary bodies, tha-
lamic nuclei, or the retrosplenial cortex [85]. Further-
more, creation of emotional memories engages addition-
al brain regions such as the amygdala [86] and prefrontal
cortex [87]. Thus, stimulating the selected ensemble of
hippocampal neurons may fail to “turn off” a memory
one may wish to edit, overwrite, or erase. In these
circumstances, it would be necessary to target neurons
of the whole network, which seems not only infeasible,
but also potentially dangerous (for the reasons we have
outlined above). On the other hand, activation of the
dentate gyrus neurons that code for contextual content
of memory (so often targeted in the aforementioned
studies) may prove crucial in initiating the activity of
the whole network. This was actually suggested by a
study by Goshen et al. [39], who showed that even the
recall of very remote, well-consolidated memories
stored in the prefrontal cortex required undisturbed ac-
tivity of the hippocampus (see “Erasure and Recovery of
Selected Memories on Demand”). However, this issue
will probably not be settled until speaking subjects
undergo memory-modifying procedures with the use
of optogenetics.
Finally, some of the side effects are difficult to antic-
ipate based on animal models alone, due to the inacces-
sibility of animals’ “subjective thoughts and experi-
ences.” Altering memories may yield changes in emo-
tional processes, sense of self, or behaviors. Strikingly,
some of these side effects might be undetectable even by
future human participants, given that people display an
incredible propensity to rationalize their most extraordi-
nary behaviors, as demonstrated indisputably by years
of studies on patients subjected to the procedures of
implementation of false memories [31, 88] or those with
commissurotomy or split brain [89]. Thus, unless the
change is extreme enough to be visible to others, alter-
ations in a patient’s behavior, emotionality, or person-
ality may go unnoticed by the patient himself. This issue
is particularly relevant in the context of the unsurpassed
precision and selectivity of action of optogenetics.
Call for a Debate on the Neuroethical Consequences
of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics
The properties of optogenetics discussed above make it
a powerful yet highly ambivalent (in ethical terms)
neuromodulation technique. Moreover, as optogenetics
is one of the fastest-developing neuromodulation tech-
nologies, with more and more laboratories becoming
equipped with optogenetic tools worldwide, and as it
differs from previous MMTs, there is an urgent need to
initiate a debate on its more elusive ethical conse-
quences before it can be allowed as an accepted form
of treatment for humans.
This review is a first step in this process, as we
considered new emerging possibilities associated with
optogenetics in the field of memory modification, and
contrasted it with other MMTs to shed light on differ-
ences distinguishing these techniques. Moreover, we
analyzed the most general challenges that optogenetics
will have to face before it can be applied as a form of
treatment or cognitive enhancement in humans. Some of
the most basic ethical issues (such as efficacy and safety
concerns) associated with the application of
optogenetics to humans have already begun to be ad-
dressed [21–25]. However, as optogenetics is being
intensively investigated in the context of the develop-
ment of effective brain stimulation treatments for vari-
ous neurological and psychiatric disorders such as
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depression [8], schizophrenia [10, 13], anxiety and pain
[11], movement disorders [14], including Parkinson’s
disease [9, 65], addictions [90], epilepsy [91], and
memory-related disorders such as PTSD [12], dience-
phalic amnesia, and Alzheimer’s disease [7], it is con-
ceivable that optogenetics or other optogenetic-like
neurostimulation methods (that allow for a similar de-
gree of neural specificity and precision, will eventually
be used to apply these findings as a form of therapy in
humans. And, indeed, some optogenetics findings re-
garding characterization of neural circuits and their dys-
function in various brain diseases are currently inspiring
novel stimulation protocols that are planned to be ap-
plied as a form of treatment in humans by means of
refined DBS [92].
Although some dissenting voices have indicated that
it is too early yet to consider neuroethical issues which
revolve around approaching neuromodulation technol-
ogies (see, for instance, [93]), we (as well as some
others; see, e.g., [25, 94]) hold opposing views: we
believe that the role of neuroethics is actually to think
ahead and act proactively rather than reactively, so that a
sufficient amount of relevant literature will be available
to fall back on when various technologies are about to
be applied in humans; in this way, ethics committees
will not be forced to make ill-informed ad-hoc decisions
when facing the dilemma of whether to issue approval
for a specific investigation or treatment involving inva-
sive neurostimulation technologies. Therefore, in the
final two sections, we would like to outline some of
these more intangible neuroethical challenges. We will
consider, in the first section, ethical problems associated
with forms of memory modification shared by
optogenetics with other MMTs (but which may still
generate novel ethical problems), as well as, in the final
section, those that may be specific to optogenetics due to
its unique memory-modifying possibilities.
Memory-Modifying Potential and Related
Neuroethical Challenges of Optogenetics Shared
with Other MMTs
Optogenetics offers some forms of memory modifica-
tion that have been achieved with the use of other
MMTs (albeit, as we mentioned earlier, with varying
success and to a limited extent). These include modi-
fication of certain details of a specific memory/
implantation of false memories [29, 30] and
alteration/diminution of the memory valence [41]. In
the following section, we discuss what neuroethical
consequences these memory-modifying possibilities
can have by revisiting neuroethical challenges that
were previously raised towards other MMTs in the
light of the memory-modifying potential of
optogenetics. In “The Issue of Exploitation,” “The
Issue of Appropriate Moral Reaction,” and “The Issue
of Altering Evaluative Schemes and Dispositions,”we
also present a new context in which memory-
mod i f y i ng po t en t i a l o f MMTs ( i n c l ud i ng
optogenetics) can be used and new neuroethical chal-
lenges that emerge from these scenarios. More specif-
ically, we argue that modification of valence of sol-
diers’ war memories can lead to several issues: exploi-
tation of soldiers’ memories which can be in the
interest of authoritarian governments (see “The Issue
of Exploitation”), inappropriate moral reactions
which may alienate a soldier from society as his/her
reactions appear inhuman to third-parties (see, 8.3),
and changing evaluative scheme and dispositions
which may make soldiers an existential threat to
others (see “The Issue of Altering Evaluative Schemes
and Dispositions”). Moreover, when discussing these
issues in “The Issue of Appropriate Moral Reaction”
and “The Issue of Altering Evaluative Schemes and
Dispositions” as well as the issue of adaptiveness in
“The Issue of Adaptiveness,” we indicate when and
why novel memory-modi fying poten t ia l of
optogenetics can yield more serious neuroethical con-
sequences compared with the previous MMTs.
The Issue of “Natural” Recovery from Traumatic
Experiences
One basic ethical concern associated with medical in-
terventions is the question of who should receive the
treatment. As long as prognostic indicators of the devel-
opment of psychological disorders such as PTSD in the
immediate aftermath of trauma are not fully developed,
MMTs that rely on intervention within the consolidation
window take the risk that the patient will be deprived of
the opportunity to attempt recovery from trauma on his
or her own through an appeal to rational capacities, for
example via the construction of a redemptive story to
promote posttraumatic growth [95].11 On the other
11 “The experience of positive change that occurs as a result of the
struggle with highly challenging life crises” [96].
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hand, as some MMTs (e.g., propranolol, optogenetics)
have the potential to modify even well-consolidated
memories, this opportunity may reduce the above ethi-
cal concern through the introduction of legal regulations
mandating that only memories contributing to the de-
velopment of a particular trauma are to be treated (see
also [53]).
The Issue of Exploitation
One fundamental and inherent issue common to all of
the interventions discussed above is that memories con-
stituting the most plausible candidates for such modifi-
cations often involve some form of moral transgression,
as experiences of this kind are especially disturbing and
traumatic for humans. However, alteration of the va-
lence of memories involving moral transgression (i.e.,
switching them from negative to positive) may be am-
bivalent even in cases where memories have proved to
be maladaptive and have resulted in the development of
a psychological disorder. Consider the potential usage
of MMT to alter the valence of memories of war vet-
erans who have developed PTSD. A government which
pursues an imperialist policy may actually possess a
vital interest in the modification of the valence of sol-
diers’ war memories not only in order to treat these
soldiers but also to use their testimony to propagate
more positive images of war in order to gain broader
support for military campaigns as well as to gain new
recruits attracted by military stories.
The Issue of Appropriate Moral Reaction
The discussed case, however, entails not only the po-
tential malpractices of authoritarian governments but
also the issue of appropriate moral reaction. As moral
agents, we can respond to events in more or less appro-
priate ways [97, 98]. In the case discussed above, sol-
diers may have either harmed others or been harmed
themselves. Some argue that it is appropriate to feel
resentment and indignation in the case of experiencing
harm and guilt and regret after harming others [97, 99,
100]. Arguably, if soldiers experienced harm and devel-
oped PTSD as the result of an event, the issue of appro-
priate moral reaction would be less problematic, provid-
ed the government did not use the soldiers as a propa-
ganda tool.
However, cases in which soldiers harm others are
particularly morally problematic. It may be argued that
it would be at least morally ambivalent to modify mem-
ories of soldiers who had committed horrific acts, even
if those memories resulted in PTSD. Consider the con-
sequences of altering the valence of the dreadful mem-
ories of a soldier who had committed genocide, who
would thus arguably be free from PTSD along with the
guilty conscience that would normally have resulted
from his deeds. Some would argue that murderers
should express appropriate moral reactions to deeds they
have every reason to feel guilty about.12
Even more morally alarming in this case is that the
valence of the soldier’s memory of genocide would be
changed from negative to positive—the opportunity
provided by the novel potential of optogenetics. Thus,
he might actually develop a disposition to take pleasure
in recalling his inhuman acts. This situation seems en-
tirely different, from a moral standpoint, from one in
which the valence of a traumatic memory is merely
blunted (as is already offered by MM drugs, such as
propranolol). It might be argued that every human
being—independently of his or her past—deserves to
be free from psychological disorders or even from a
guilty conscience; however, it is much more controver-
sial to argue that humans have the right to alter the
valence of memories of their own horrific acts so as to
actively enjoy them.
The Issue of Altering Evaluative Schemes
and Dispositions
Moreover, assuming that alteration of the valence of a
particular memory could become generalized to other
instances of this type of memory (e.g., from a memory
of killing a particular person tomemories of killing other
people), it might introduce changes in an individual’s
overall evaluative system of such acts as well as in his
desires. For instance, a soldier, having changed the
valence of his war memories, could develop “a taste
for killing.” Thus, meddling with the valence of trau-
matic memories of war veterans could make them “so-
ciopathic,” as they might become disposed to obtain
satisfaction from harming others—the possibility that
seems to be especially acute in case of optogenetic
interventions involving the change of valence from neg-
ative to positive.
12 Erler [99] makes a similar point when discussing the “Lady Mac-
beth” case presented in Kass [101].
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The Issue of Authenticity
The possibility that blunting memories may change the
evaluative system of a person is linked to the issue of
authenticity. In many conceptions of authenticity, deriv-
ing from various lineages—essentialist (self-discovery)
(e.g., [102]), existentialist (self-creation) (e.g., [103]
[1943]), and dual-basis framework (e.g., [104])—being
“truthful” to oneself is directly associated with living in
alignment with one’s values. Thus, a person whose
values have been changed as a result of alteration of
the valence of her memories would commit either an act
of “betrayal” of her true self, according to the essential-
ists, since, as a result of her evaluative change, she might
begin to lead a life inconsistent with her given and fixed
essence (for further considerations, see [105]), or an act
of self-deception, according to the “Sartrean” existen-
tialists, as the process of self-creation would stem not
from the values that she had freely chosen, but from
those constituting side effects of the memory-modifying
intervention (for additional considerations see, [99,
106]). Either way, such an intervention may pose a
threat to the patient’s authenticity.
The Issue of Adaptiveness
Another problem with the kinds of memory-
modifications common to various MMTs is that some
memories, despite being unequivocally negative or
disturbing, may be highly adaptive; accordingly, chang-
ing the valence of certain highly aversive and unpleasant
memories may be undesirable or even dangerous in
cases where the memory is indicative of a genuine
threat. Let us recall the above-mentioned consequences
of propranolol-based interventions in cases of arachno-
phobia, in which participants developed generalized and
excessively positive responses to spiders—a disposition
which could prove deadly in an encounter with a ven-
omous spider in the wild [53]. As optogenetics poten-
tially offers not only to blunt the emotionality of specific
memories and associated emotional reactions—as in the
case of propranolol—but also to switch the valence of
specific memory, the issue of adaptiveness could be-
come even more problematic when memory-modifying
interventions are applied with the use of optogenetics.
Elsey and Kindt [53] also point out that interventions
that resulted in “the development of an overly potent
appetitive memory could be highly disruptive. This is
evident in addiction, in which the rewarding properties
of drug consumption gave so much control over behav-
ior that the drug is pursued even to the detriment of the
person’s health, relationships, and personal commit-
ments.” Therefore, going “beyond the norm” regarding
the emotional valence of a given memory may prove
unfavorable, whether the change of valence is from
positive to negative or vice versa.
Unique Memory-Modifying Potential
of Optogenetics and Related Neuroethical
Challenges
On the other hand, optogenetics offers unique possibil-
ities that have never been achieved with the use of any
other MMT. In “The Issue of Losing Motivation to
Work for Systemic Change,” “The Issue of Negative
Composition Effects,” and “The Issue of Autonomy and
the Principle of Conformity Regarding Memory Era-
sure,” we revisit some of the neuroethical challenges
that have been raised towards hypothetical memory-
modifying interventions before the advent of an MMT
that could actually enable them. As now optogenetics
can be regarded as such anticipated MMT, we revise
these arguments in the light of optogenetics findings,
grounding prior speculations in the empirical reality.
Moreover, optogenetics provides even greater
memory-modifying opportunities than have previously
been assumed including selective and reversible erasure
(repeated deactivation and reactivation) of a specific
memory and the retrieval of forgotten (or suppressed)
memories. These new possibilities for memory modifi-
cation may be associated with novel neuroethical chal-
lenges that have not previously been addressed. Thus, in
the final sections “The Issue of Moral Obligations” and
“The Issue of Personal Identity,” we discuss some new
neuroethical challenges that could arise due to unique
memory-modifying prospects of optogenetics and pro-
pose a new solution to one of the previously speculative
concerns.
The Issue of Losing Motivation to Work for Systemic
Change
The nature of the humanmind is such that often the most
plausible target of optogenetic erasure comprises trau-
matic yet self-defining memories, since traumas often
play a critical role in forming personal identity [95,
107]. Furthermore, traumatic memories may also play
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a role in shaping the personality; for instance, those who
experienced childhood trauma were shown to exhibit
greater empathy than those who did not [108]. Finally,
as demonstrated by the #MeToo movement or, recently,
by the #BlackLivesMatter movement, some intersubjec-
tively shared types of traumatic experiences and mem-
ories (such as of sexual abuse or racial discrimination)
may, for instance, motivate people to organize in order
to combat systemic forms of maltreatment that they and
those close to them have experienced. Thus, removing
traumatic memories may render systemic change in
society impossible: people freed from traumatic experi-
ences might lose the motivational component of their
traumatic memories and cease to fight against the injus-
tices they have experienced.
The Issue of Negative Composition Effects
It can be argued, nonetheless, that people should not be
forced to retain their traumatic memories, as a human
being should be treated not as a means for other ends
(here, the welfare of society), but rather as an end in
itself. However, as Lavazza [109] points out, the com-
bination of several individual choices can entail nega-
tive composition effects. In a nutshell, although each
individual does what appears, prima facie, to be the best
for herself—e.g., erase memories of maltreatment—and
enjoy temporarily subjective relief from painful experi-
ence, in the absence of centralized coordination of these
actions, individual choices may backfire on both the
individual making them as well as, in the future, other
members of society, as the objective conditions that led
to the traumas in the first place remain unchanged; thus,
the aggregate consequences of the choice to erase trau-
matic memories made by a sufficient number of indi-
viduals would actually help to preserve oppressive so-
cial relations and serve the interests of oppressors.
Negative composition effects need not appear at the
level of society; they may also be revealed at the more
“local” level of the life of an individual. A hypothetical
case posed by Glannon [110] is a good exemplification
of this: a young academic experiences a traumatic fail-
ure during a public event; devastated, she decides to
erase the memory of this event. However, similar fail-
ures happen again and again. On every occasion, she
uses optogenetics to erase the disturbing memory. Thus,
as the opportunity to erase memories is always available
to the young scholar, she avoids dealing with the struc-
tural weakness responsible for her failures.
Consequently, she falls into a cycle of repeating mis-
takes and erasing her memories of them. Thus, although
subjectively well, she will eventually be overwhelmed
by external reality, ending up worse off than she would
have been without optogenetic interventions.13
The Issue of Autonomy and the Principle of Conformity
Regarding Memory Erasure
Not allowing for dampening traumatic memories on the
above discussed grounds—due to concerns about nega-
tive composition effects—may breach not only the
Kantian imperative, but also the liberal principle of
individual autonomy understood as “self-rule” or “self-
government” [113]. According to the latter principle, the
very idea of self-rule relies on the right to control one’s
own mind; thus memories—being a fundamental part of
it—would certainly seem to be included (see [114]).
However, given the nature of life in society, it is appar-
ently beneficial for all parties to impose certain limita-
tions on the potential choices and actions of its mem-
bers; here, for example, Mill’s principle of liberty might
be recalled.14 Moreover, in an apparent paradox, impos-
ing restrictions on personal autonomy can be beneficial
in terms of exercising autonomy: a Hobbesian society
functioning according to the homo homini lupus rule
would possibly exercise autonomy at the beginning (at
least of some of the most powerful members of society),
but over time “continuous conflict would repeatedly put
at risk our ability to self-determination, since violent
interferences with our choices would be the norm. It
therefore seems that the “rule” of autonomy should be
implemented so that, even if everyone took it to the
highest degree, it would still be possible for everyone
to exercise it” [109].
We are not arguing that an individual’s interest in
avoiding pain from traumatic memories and potential
development of PTSD should be always subordinate to
society’s interest in changing oppressive structures. Po-
tential middle-ground pragmatic solutions exist.
Lavazza [109] proposed, for instance: “to allow the
treatment to those who show the greatest signs of suf-
fering.” At the same time, we may want to ask the most
motivated individuals to be “volunteers” and to preserve
13 See Lavazza [111, 112], who considers this case in terms of the risk
of losing touch with reality and the consequences thereof.
14 “… that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others” [115].
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their memories intact in order to continue the fight
against experienced injustices. Moreover, it is worth
noting that, as long as choices to erase memories arise
only occasionally, the principle of autonomy appears to
outweigh the principle of conformity regarding memory
erasure mentioned above.
In our view, however, there will always be a tension
between the interests of the individual and society, as it
is unlikely that governments (or other decision-makers)
will ever be able to reliably predict the aggregate con-
sequences emerging from the decisions of individuals.
Thus, assessment of the admissibility of optogenetic
memory modifications is no simple matter, as it requires
careful consideration of the aggregate societal conse-
quences of these interventions.
The Issue of Moral Obligations
Kolber [114] considers a situation in which a bystander
is the only person to see the face of a serial rapist fleeing
the home of his latest victim. Arguably, most would
agree that even though this bystander might find this
memory upsetting and might want to erase it, she should
be legally obliged to retain it in the interests of
preventing the serial rapist from committing future
crimes. This case raises the issue of moral obligations
regarding memory modifications. However, should we
reach the same conclusion when the only person to see
the serial rapist’s face is the victim of the rape? When
Kolber posed this question in 2006, the only way to
diminish a given memory was through interference with
the process of its formation. Therefore, the decision
whether to dampen a memory had to be made quickly,
within several hours after the event in question, which
would preclude the victim’s testimony in a subsequent
court trial. Postponing memory erasure, on the other
hand, would render the procedure ineffective. In an
attempt to answer the above question, we may again
consider negative composition effects: if every victim
erased her traumatic memory, social safety would dete-
riorate greatly, since no victims would testify and crim-
inals would remain free to commit additional crimes
[109]. However, given the novel capacity of
optogenetics to target and selectively erase well-
consolidated memories, we may possess tools in the
future to erase traumatic memories after their deposition
within the context of a criminal prosecution; thus, this
protocol could provide a solution to the discussed prob-
lem. Moreover, speculatively, in a case where such
memories were desperately needed during other stages
of the prosecution (as arguably might sometimes be the
case), optogenetics could potentially reintroduce them
into the victim’s memory system in order to gain addi-
tional necessary evidence. Our considerations here dem-
onstrate that confronting existing arguments with em-
pirical data is crucial as answers to neuroethical prob-
lems can differ given distinct capabilities of various
technologies.
The moral obligation to remember can be discussed
either when one experienced harm (one is the victim), or
when one harms others (one is the offender). Liao and
Sandberg [97] argue that in a case in which one is the
offender, one has “a duty not to remove these kinds of
memories until one has come to realize one’s errors.”
Thus, Liao and Sandberg argue for “the duty to remem-
ber” on the grounds of the value of the appropriateness
of moral reactions. On the other hand, they also empha-
size that the moral obligation to remember is particularly
relevant if deliberately forgetting might increase the
likelihood of future crimes of this type. However, this
solution might be questioned, as Liao and Sandberg
acknowledge, citing Levy [116], who argues that “de-
liberate forgetting could decrease the likelihood of fu-
ture crimes of this type, because remembering may
make it easier to commit the crime in the future, since
one has already done it before” [97].
Thus—from the perspective of the interests of society
and for consequentialist reasons—which of these strat-
egies would be more beneficial in terms of crime pre-
vention is an empirical question. Obviously, however,
one can argue in favor of the duty not to erase offenders’
memories of moral transgressions on the grounds of
other moral values, such as autonomy. Let us recall the
protagonist Alex in Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork
Orange (1971), who was “rehabilitated” by means of
the aversion therapy to the extent that, as Cabrera and
Elger [117] point out, he ceased to be capable of any
moral action.
The Issue of Personal Identity
Although it appears that the reversible erasure of a
specific memory offers an ideal form of memory ma-
nipulation (as we can always bring the erased memory
back), there is the risk that the restoration of an erased
memory may not be accomplished without conse-
quences. Studies show that some memories may exert
enormous impacts on who we are and what we pursue in
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our lives. These are so-called self-defining memories
[118]. Singer et al. [119] argue that suchmemories serve
as the ingredients for an individual’s overall life story,
and thus constitute that individual’s narrative identity.
Schechtman [120] famously argues that the narrative is
the answer to the “characterization question”—the ques-
tion of “what makes a person who she is.” Schechtman
also imposes normative constraints upon a narrative
considered constitutive of the self. According to the
articulation constraint, the narrative must be coherent
and intelligible. According to the reality constraint, it
must correspond to basic facts about the person’s life
([120], 83; 113–114). Thus, in the light of Schechtman’s
theory of narrative identity and the above insights
concerning self-defining memories, the concern regard-
ing optogenetic erasure of a self-defining memory is that
a given individual’s narrative—the very requirement of
being oneself—might be disrupted.15
If this were the case, however, it could be argued that,
given the capacity of optogenetics to reintroduce mem-
ories into the memory system, these potentially undesir-
able effects of memory erasure/deactivation could easily
be reversed through reactivation of the memory trace.
However, reactivation of self-defining memories may
fail, as the individual’s narrative identity may have
already changed. Therefore, the individual might feel
alienated from the newly reactivated memory as a result
of feeling that she is no longer the same person.16
Consequently, the re-integration of (previously) self-
defining memories with a subject’s newly developed
narrative identity might prove impossible.
Conclusions
Taking the above considerations into account, it appears
that optogenetics is not free of the ethical challenges
posed by existing MMTs. However, depending on
which of the presented methods of memory modifica-
tion is utilized in practice, these challenges may take
different forms.
For instance, as we discussed above, optogenetic
interventions promise not only to blunt emotional
(traumatic) memories but also to change their valences
from negative to positive and vice versa. In cases of such
interventions, the issue of exploitation seems to be of
particular importance, as political regimes could use
optogenetics for their own purposes. On one hand, this
concern appears graver in the case of changing a
memory’s valence, as opposed to erasure of a specific
memory, as authoritarian governments may wish to use
war veterans as propaganda tools by imposing positive
valences on extremely negative, traumatic war memo-
ries. On the other hand, the issue of exploitation may
prove even more disturbing in cases where optogenetics
is used to erase memories of, e.g., brutal interrogations
of prisoners of war.
The issue of appropriate moral reaction has also
been inherited from other MMTs in the case of
optogenetic interventions involving the reversible era-
sure of memories. Here, however, the issue might also
take on a somewhat different and possibly even more
problematic shape. If a personwere to be deprived of the
declarative knowledge of a given memory, the expres-
sion of an appropriate moral reaction would arguably be
impossible. Such a lack of an appropriate moral and
emotional reaction might seem heartless and inhuman
from the perspective of the surrounding community.
Alternatively, a person whose memory valence had
been changed would still possess this memory, and
could thus plausibly fake an appropriate moral reaction
(as psychopaths do); this also raises serious ethical
concerns.
The issue of authenticity is also relevant in the case of
the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics.
Changes in the valences, as well as the complete remov-
al, of memories may cause changes in a person’s eval-
uative schema, especially since such interventions
would likely be especially frequent in cases of highly
emotional—such as self-defining (traumatic)—memo-
ries; thus, being “truthful” to oneself, understood as
living according to one’s values, may prove problematic
in such scenarios. In this context, it is worth considering
the moral dilemma faced by the soldier-murderer
discussed above if his memories were to be erased by
means of optogenetics. Such an individual might not
only lack the appropriate moral reactions (as in the case
15 See also a discussion on how a narrative can be endangered by
another neuromodulation technology, DBS, as a side effect of
memory-unrelated intervention, in Schechtman [121] and Baylis [122].
16 Despite the fact that these studies were not associated with interven-
tions in memory, psychological phenomena of alienation were ob-
served as a side effect of neuromodulatory therapy in patients treated
with DBS (see, e.g., [123, 124]). Although optogenetics can be expect-
ed to deliver stimulation in a far more precise and selective manner
than DBS, it could still lead to some form of psychological alienation
that would, however, result not from technological limitations (e.g.,
imprecise and diffused DBS electrical currents), but from the very act
of tampering with a specific memory that could be constitutive for
one’s personal identity and authenticity.
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of modifying the valence of a memory), but might even
be unaware that he had been a killer.
What should be clear, given the above consider-
ations, is that the potential of optogenetics to modify
memories generates manymore questions than answers.
However, as many optogenetic interventions are de-
signed for therapeutic purposes and as the first human
clinical trials using optogenetics are already underway,
we argue that the neuroethical community must start to
consider the ethical challenges associated with the vast
capabilities of optogenetics. In this review article, we
focused on the memory-modifying potential of
optogenetics. However, optogenetics is not restricted
to this area, and notable achievements have also been
made in other fields of optogenetic research. Thus, we
encourage neuroethicists to begin to address potential
ethical concerns that may arise in these other
neuromodulatory contexts. Although it will probably
take some years before scientists find solutions to the
current technical and safety problems of optogenetics,
and while some time is likely to pass before
optogenetics, or optogenetic-like technology (for now,
the refined DBS system appears to be the most likely
candidate; see [19, 92]), is approved as a form of treat-
ment for a broader spectrum of brain disorders, it is the
role of neuroethicists to anticipate the more universal
ethical challenges that optogenetics will eventually have
to face.
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